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NOTE
ALLEN V. COOPER: RAISING THE FLAG OF SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY IN THE SHIFTING SEAS OF COPYRIGHT
WILL R. GALLAGHER*
The expansion of maritime trade in the mid-1600s sparked the “Golden
Age of Piracy,” when fearless privateers plundered the high seas for fame
and fortune.1 One of the most infamous pirates of this era, Blackbeard, left
plenty of both for the history books.2 As traditional piracy has faded from
our shores, digital piracy has largely taken its place. But no pirate legend or
sea shanty could have foretold that Blackbeard’s ship would one day be at
the center of a stunning decision that condones modern piracy of citizens’
copyrights, as long as the infringement is committed by a state.
In Allen v. Cooper,3 the United States Supreme Court considered
whether the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act (“CRCA”) validly
abrogated state sovereign immunity from copyright infringement suits.4
Relying on a convoluted interpretation of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine, the Court held that neither Article I nor the Fourteenth Amendment
could anchor the law.5 In the Court’s view, the CRCA lacked “congruence
and proportionality” between its intended remedy and the perceived record
of state misconduct.6 The decision completely bars infringement remedies
for copyright owners whose works have been commandeered by a state,
leaving them stranded without recourse until Congress can soon muster up a
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1. Stephen Barnett, Monsters of Their Own Making: Understanding the Context of the Rise of
the “Golden Age of Piracy,” 5 LOGOS, Fall 2012, at 19.
2. Id. at 20 (recounting the lore surrounding Blackbeard and depicting his formidable
appearance as “a complete fury; with three brace pistols in holsters, slung over his shoulders like
bandoliers, and lighted matches under his hat sticking out over each of his ears”).
3. 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
4. Id. at 1000.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1007; see infra Sections IV.B–C.
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more narrowly tailored statute.7 Regardless of the historical record or degree
of intent, allowing states to skirt liability for copyright infringement subverts
the fundamental goals of the copyright system to promote and protect artistic
expression.8
I. THE CASE
In 1717, the legendary pirate Blackbeard captured a French frigate,
made it his flagship, and renamed it Queen Anne’s Revenge.9 Shortly
thereafter, his new prize ran aground one mile off the coast of North
Carolina.10 Blackbeard and his crew escaped unharmed, and the wreckage
lay beneath the sea for hundreds of years until 1996, when it was discovered
by the maritime exploration firm Intersal.11 Due to its proximity to shore,
North Carolina legally owned the wreck and its booty.12 The State contracted
with Intersal to supervise the excavation.13 Intersal then hired aquatic
videography company Nautilus Productions, headed by Rick Allen, to
document the process.14 The agreement provided that Allen would finance
the project and in return own copyrights in all of the resulting audiovisual
works.15
In 2013, the State began posting some of Allen’s images to its website
without permission, and the parties negotiated a settlement whereby the State
agreed to pay him $15,000 for its wrongdoing.16 Notwithstanding the
settlement, the State then passed “Blackbeard’s Law,” which explicitly
placed media depicting any “derelict vessel or shipwreck” into the public
domain, effectively eliminating Allen’s copyright protections.17 After
discovering further infringement, Allen promptly filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. 18 The State
countered by raising a sovereign immunity defense, but the district court

7. See infra Section IV.C.
8. See infra Section IV.D.
9. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.; 43 U.S.C. § 2105(c); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 121–22 (West 2019). Thousands of
artifacts have been recovered and restored, including twenty-four cannons. See Discovery of the
Shipwreck, QUEEN ANNE’S REVENGE PROJECT, https://www.qaronline.org/history/discoveryshipwreck [https://perma.cc/9WS5-HZKZ].
13. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 999.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 121–25(b) (West 2016).
18. Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525 (E.D.N.C. 2017), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
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agreed with Allen that the CRCA had validly abrogated sovereign immunity
from copyright infringement suits pursuant to Congress’s authority to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.19 The State appealed, and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed.20 Following the Fourth
Circuit’s reversal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the CRCA had a valid constitutional basis in either Article I or the Fourteenth
Amendment.21
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The doctrine of state sovereign immunity generally prohibits citizens
from filing suit against a nonconsenting state. 22 It is rooted in the English
common law principle that members of the ruling class could not be tried
without their consent because their authority was unquestionable.23 The
Eleventh Amendment reinforces the state sovereign immunity doctrine by
revoking federal courts’ jurisdiction to hear suits brought by out-of-state
plaintiffs against a state.24 Over time, a meandering and divided Supreme
Court has greatly expanded the scope of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine, divorcing it from the plain text of the Amendment.25
Under the Court’s jurisprudence, there are two mechanisms by which
state sovereign immunity can be overcome. First, the state itself can waive
immunity by enacting a waiver statute.26 Second, immunity can be abrogated
by an act of Congress.27 Although the Court has always maintained the
viability of both of these mechanisms, it has adopted increasingly restrictive
standards in recent cases that make both of these avenues more difficult to

19. Id. at 535 (“Congress was clearly responding to a pattern of current and anticipated abuse
by the states of the copyrights held by their citizens.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
20. Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018).
21. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020).
22. Id.
23. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 460 (1793) (“In England . . . no suit can be brought
against the King, even in civil matters.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
25. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“Despite the
narrowness of its terms . . . we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for
what it says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms . . . .”).
26. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (“[I]f a State waives its
immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.”).
27. Id. at 242–43.
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navigate.28 Implied or abstract language, whether in a state-initiated waiver
of sovereign immunity or a congressional abrogation statute, no longer
suffices.29
Both waivers and abrogation statutes must clearly and
“unequivocal[ly]” invoke abrogation to be valid.30
Abrogation statutes must also be supported by a valid constitutional
basis.31 Historically, statutes like the CRCA have anchored their abrogatory
authority upon Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment.32 In the past two
decades, however, the Court has whittled the viable constitutional
foundations down to a single provision: Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.33
Section II.A outlines the murky history of the state sovereign immunity
doctrine and traces its modern developments.34 Section II.B reviews the
doctrine’s application to statutes passed pursuant to Article I powers.35
Section II.C explains how the Court has shifted from a policy of deference to
Congress to one of zealous oversight by restricting abrogations to those that
are narrowly tailored to enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment.36
A. State Sovereign Immunity in United States Law
State sovereign immunity is a key check on federal power that derives
from the unquestionable political authority of English feudal royalty.37 As it
was not discernible in the text of the Constitution, the Framers disagreed
about whether state sovereign immunity was embodied therein by some other
means.38 Anti-federalists worried that the Constitution would permit suits
brought by citizens against states in federal court, which they sought to

28. Id. at 238–40; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519–20 (1997) (abrogation
statutes must be tailored to “remedy or prevent” state conduct that violates the Fourteenth
Amendment).
29. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (“[E]vidence of congressional intent must be
both unequivocal and textual.”).
30. Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 239–40.
31. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (abrogation statutes must be enacted “pursuant
to a valid exercise of power”).
32. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 635–
36 (1999) (“Congress justified the Patent Remedy Act under three sources of constitutional
authority: the Patent Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; and
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
33. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
34. See infra Section II.A.
35. See infra Section II.B.
36. See infra Section II.C.
37. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10–12 (1890).
38. Id. at 12–15.
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prevent.39 This construction, however, was widely rebuffed by antifederalists and federalists alike, who maintained that states would be
immune.40 When the Supreme Court in 1793 permitted a diversity suit
against a state in federal court in Chisholm v. Georgia,41 Congress swiftly
moved to overturn this widely disfavored ruling by enacting the Eleventh
Amendment.42 The text of the Amendment only specifically barred diversity
suits, however, and left unclear the status of in-state and federal question
suits.43
The open question of how the Eleventh Amendment would treat in-state
plaintiffs was addressed in Hans v. Louisiana,44 wherein the Supreme Court
upheld Louisiana’s sovereign immunity defense from a suit brought by the
State’s own citizen.45 By distancing the doctrine from the constitutional text,
the Court—newly appreciative of sovereign immunity—set in motion a new
and more expansive interpretation of the doctrine that continues to drive
modern sovereign immunity jurisprudence.46 Nevertheless, members of the
Court have fervently and increasingly disagreed about whether to adopt a
broad interpretation that prevents most suits against states, as the Court had
in Hans, or a narrow one that more closely tracks the language of the Eleventh
Amendment.47

39. Id. at 14. Article III empowers the federal judiciary to hear cases “between a State and
citizens of another State.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. A literal interpretation of the neutral word
“between” suggests that federal jurisdiction would exist regardless of whether the state is a plaintiff
or a defendant. See Between, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (online ed., 2021), https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/between (“by the common action of; jointly engaging; . . . in common to;
shared by”).
40. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13–14; THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (George
Sade ed., 2006) (“Unless . . . there is a surrender of [sovereign] immunity in the plan of the
convention, it will remain with the States.”).
41. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
42. Hans, 134 U.S. at 11 (“This amendment . . . actually reversed the decision of the Supreme
Court.”). Interestingly, the Eleventh Amendment does not change the language of the Constitution
but rather tells us how to interpret it, or, more accurately, how not to interpret it. U.S. CONST.
amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity . . . .”) (emphasis added).
43. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (2020).
44. 134 U.S. 1.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
47. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There
is first the correct and literal interpretation of the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment . . . . In
addition, there is the defense of sovereign immunity that the Court has added to the text of the
Amendment . . . .”), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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B. Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity Under Article I
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress several
enumerated powers, including the power to foster scientific and artistic
innovation by “securing . . . exclusive” rights to patent and copyright
owners.48 These grants of federal authority necessarily limit state power.49
But after handing down a series of inconsistent decisions in recent decades,
a narrow majority of the Court has essentially abandoned Article I as a source
of abrogatory power by separating state sovereign immunity from the federalstate power calculus entirely and concluding that immunity cannot be
constrained even by ostensibly plenary Article I powers.50
In an early waiver case, Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks
Dep’t,51 the Court rejected a state’s sovereign immunity defense in a suit
brought under the Federal Employers Liability Act, finding that the state had
impliedly waived its immunity when it ratified the Commerce Clause and
subsequently engaged in interstate business.52 The Court found that the Act’s
language, which held “every common carrier” liable to suits brought by
passengers who suffered injuries, included state-owned railroad agencies.53
Put simply: If Congress speaks broadly about a right to sue without expressly
indicating that states are immune, then state and private actors are liable to

48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[Congress shall have power to] promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). Commonly referred to as the Intellectual
Property Clause, this language forms the foundation of both patent and copyright law. See generally
Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background
and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP.
L. 1 (1995).
49. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 16 (1989) (“[T]he Commerce Clause with one hand gives power
to Congress while, with the other, it takes power away from the States.”), overruled by Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
50. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996) (“Even when the Constitution
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment
prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”).
51. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
52. Id. at 191 (stating states had “surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted
Congress the power to regulate commerce”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall
have power to] regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes . . . .”). Although the Parden Court framed the statutory language as providing a
“waiver” of immunity, the case is more aptly characterized as an abrogation rather than a waiver,
since a waiver would not require any constitutional grounding. See Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
53. Parden, 377 U.S. at 185–88 (“We think that Congress, in making the FELA applicable to
“every” common carrier . . . meant what it said. That congressional statutes regulating railroads in
interstate commerce apply to such railroads whether they are state owned or privately owned is
hardly a novel proposition; it has twice been clearly affirmed by this Court.”).
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the same extent.54 Two decades later, the Court in Atascadero State Hospital
v. Scanlon55 departed from this precedent and limited the validity of waiver
and abrogation provisions to cases where the state’s intent to waive or
Congress’s intent to abrogate was unmistakably clear.56
Continuing to fluctuate in its interpretation of the sovereign immunity
doctrine, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 57 once again rejected a
state’s sovereign immunity defense, this time regarding a federal waste
management law that Congress had passed pursuant to Article I.58 The Court
found Congress’s intent to abrogate sufficiently clear.59 The Court then
reasoned that by ratifying the Constitution, the states had broadly consented
to liability for transgressing Congress’s Article I authority in situations where
Congress found it appropriate to hold them liable.60 Without the ability to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the Court believed that Congress’s
exercise of its Article I powers would be unduly constrained.61
Seven years later, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,62 the Court
completely reversed course and held that Article I could no longer provide a
valid basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity. 63 The contested law in
that case, which was passed pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause,64
directed states to negotiate with Native American tribes regarding the
formation of casinos on tribal land.65 The law specifically authorized federal
courts to hear suits brought by tribes against states that failed to negotiate in
good faith.66 The Court quickly found that the statutory language
demonstrated an “unmistakably clear” intent to abrogate sovereign
immunity.67 The principal question thus became whether the abrogation
54. Id.
55. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
56. Id. at 239–40 (“[A] State will be deemed to have waived its immunity ‘only where stated
“by the most express language or by such overwhelming implication from the text as [will] leave
no room for any other reasonable construction.”‘“).
57. 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
58. Id. at 23.
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 19–20 (“[T]o the extent that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate
commerce, they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it necessary, in exercising
this authority, to render them liable.”).
61. Id. at 19 (“[T]he congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the
authority to render States liable in damages . . . .”).
62. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
63. Id. at 72–73.
64. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress shall have power to] regulate Commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
66. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
67. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56.
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rested on a valid constitutional basis.68 The Court began this inquiry by
comparing the Indian Commerce Clause to the Interstate Commerce
Clause.69 As noted above, the Court had recently championed the Interstate
Commerce Clause as a valid basis for abrogation in Union Gas.70 The
Seminole Tribe Court found that the Indian Commerce Clause vested even
greater power in the federal government than the Interstate Commerce
Clause, nearly completely preempting any corresponding state regulatory
authority.71 Nevertheless, the Court overturned Union Gas, holding that
Article I could not encroach upon state sovereign immunity.72 The Court
attacked the precedential value of Union Gas on the grounds that there was
no majority opinion and that the conflicting rationales invited confusion.73
To overcome the barrier of stare decisis, the Court assumed an
affirmative duty to overrule erroneous decisions, reiterating that it “has never
felt constrained to follow precedent” when correcting past errors.74
Moreover, because the petitioners did not argue that the Act was passed
pursuant to Fourteenth Amendment powers, the Court declined to analyze
whether the Act may be justified under the Fourteenth Amendment.75
Seminole Tribe signifies a turning point in the majority’s interpretation of
state sovereign immunity wherein it now extends to areas where state laws
are preempted and federal authority is exclusive, like Indian commerce,
immigration, and intellectual property.76 This newfound discord with
preemption doctrine is unusual because it empowers states to elude legal
accountability in areas of vital importance to the federal government under
the theory that Article I simply cannot expand the constitutionally prescribed
boundaries of federal court jurisdiction set forth in Article III. 77

68. Id. at 59 (“[O]ur inquiry . . . is narrowly focused on one question: Was the Act in question
passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate?”).
69. Id. at 60–61.
70. Id. at 60.
71. Id. at 62.
72. Id. at 73.
73. Id. at 64.
74. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944).
75. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 60 (“[P]etitioner does not challenge the Eleventh Circuit’s
conclusion that the Act was passed pursuant to neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Interstate
Commerce Clause.”).
76. Id. at 72–73. The preemption doctrine prevents states from enacting laws that undermine
federal law or regulate—even harmoniously—in certain areas that have been comprehensively
legislated by Congress. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (“Where Congress
occupies an entire field . . . even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”).
77. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (“[The conclusion] that Congress could under Article I
expand the scope of federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III . . . ‘contradicted our unvarying
approach to Article III as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal-court
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Yet in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz,78 a 2006
bankruptcy case, the Supreme Court backpedaled on its sweeping holding
from Seminole Tribe.79 The Katz Court held that the Article I Bankruptcy
Clause did empower Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity from
bankruptcy suits.80 The Court distinguished bankruptcy from other Article I
powers by focusing on the Framers’ intent to enable the federal government
to restrain the states’ “wildly divergent” bankruptcy laws.81 Quite
remarkably, the Court found that no further action was needed by Congress
to abrogate state sovereign immunity from bankruptcy suits—the abrogation
had already been effectuated by ratification.82 The erosion of Congress’s
authority to abrogate under Article I leaves copyright holders whose works
have been infringed by a state with a single leg to stand on: the Fourteenth
Amendment.
C. Abrogation Under the Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment famously asserts that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . .”83 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to
“enforce” these protections through “appropriate legislation.” 84 In so doing,
the Amendment “fundamentally alter[s] the balance of state and federal
power” by permitting Congress to redress state abuse.85 Although the
Supreme Court has always recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment can
provide a basis for abrogating state sovereign immunity, in recent years it has
greatly limited the extent of permissible congressional action by developing
a new test86 and subsequently applying that test as a means to strike down
abrogation in the patent infringement context.87

jurisdiction.’”) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)), overruled by Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.
78. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
79. Id. at 363 (“[The] assumption that the holding in [Seminole Tribe] would apply to the
Bankruptcy Clause . . . was erroneous.”).
80. Id. at 359; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (“[Congress shall have power to] enact
uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States . . . .”).
81. Katz, 546 U.S. at 365.
82. Id. at 379 (“[T]he relevant ‘abrogation’ is the one effected in the plan of the [Constitutional]
Convention . . .”). This finding contradicts the Court’s typical rule that Congress must enact a clear
abrogation provision relying on a valid constitutional provision. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
84. Id. § 5.
85. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
86. See infra Section II.C.1.
87. See infra Section II.C.2.
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1. A New Test for Abrogation Under Boerne
In City of Boerne v. Flores,88 the Supreme Court held that there must be
“congruence and proportionality” between the injury to be corrected and
Congress’s remedy.89 In other words, the scope of the abrogation must be
proportional to the severity of state misconduct.90 The Boerne test requires
that the abrogatory legislation be narrowly tailored to address state conduct
that actually violates the Due Process Clause in order to be considered
“appropriate” by the Court.91 The test compels an examination into the
“nature and extent” of state conduct that allegedly violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which is often evidenced by the
legislative record.92
A critical feature of the Boerne test is that the scope of permissible
abrogatory authority can only be assessed by the Court, as Congress may not
substantively redefine Fourteenth Amendment protections.93
While
Congress can enact both remedial and prophylactic measures—a seemingly
expansive scope—Boerne made clear that abrogation legislation must be in
accordance with the Court’s view of the problems at hand.94 Because
Congress lacks the authority to determine whether a particular state act
violates the Due Process Clause, it must distinguish unconstitutional and
constitutional state acts based on existing case law in order to succeed.95
2. Abrogation in the Intellectual Property Context Under Florida
Prepaid
The first Copyright Act, passed in 1790 (just five years before the
Eleventh Amendment), defined an infringer broadly as anyone who violated

88. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
89. Id. at 520. The challenged law in Boerne was the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–bb–4.
90. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
91. Id. at 530; see also Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (“[T]he deprivation by
state action of a constitutionally protected interest . . . is not in itself unconstitutional; what is
unconstitutional is the deprivation of such an interest without due process of law.”).
92. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020).
93. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527 (“Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, nonremedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law.”).
94. Id. at 519. According to the Court, abrogation statutes are permitted to redress some state
conduct that does not inherently raise constitutional concerns. Id. at 518 (Congress may enact
remedial legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment “even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional”).
95. Id. at 519 (“Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is.”); see also Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (“[A] congressional abrogation is valid under Section 5 only
if it sufficiently connects to conduct courts have held Section 1 to proscribe.”).
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any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner.96 For over 150 years, no
court accepted a state’s sovereign immunity defense in a copyright
infringement suit.97 But after the Supreme Court began to demand
unequivocal abrogatory language, circuit courts followed suit and started to
reject the abrogatory clarity of the Copyright Act to the immense frustration
of aggrieved copyright owners.98 To address this concern, Congress tasked
Ralph Oman, the Register of Copyrights, with gauging the scope of harms
caused by state infringement.99 The Oman Report identified several clear
instances of intentional infringement and warned of “dire financial and other
repercussions that would flow” from state immunity.100
Armed with this information, the CRCA amended the language of the
copyright infringement statute to make Congress’s intent to abrogate state
sovereign immunity unmistakably clear.101 The updated law clarified that
states “shall be subject to the provisions of [copyright law] in the same
manner and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity.” 102 The new
language also specified that states shall not be immune from copyright
infringement suits “under the Eleventh Amendment” or “any other doctrine
of sovereign immunity.”103 The Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act (“PRCA”) then expanded the scope of the abrogation to
96. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). These include the right to reproduce, perform,
and distribute the work, as well as create derivative works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
97. Sovereign Immunity and the Protection of Intellectual Property: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 12 (2002) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights, United States Copyright Office) [hereinafter “Marybeth Statement”]. For example,
relying on Parden, the Ninth Circuit found the 1790 act’s language sufficient to abrogate state
immunity. Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 1979).
98. Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 117–18 (4th Cir. 1988); Lane v.
First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 871 F.2d 166, 168–69 (1st Cir. 1989); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331,
334 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[T]he general term ‘whoever’ is not the requisite unmistakable language of
congressional intent necessary to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.”).
99. The Register of Copyrights is the title given to the director of the U.S. Copyright Office.
See 17 U.S.C. § 701.
100. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REG. OF COPYRIGHTS, Copyright Liability of States and the
Eleventh
Amendment
iii
(1988)
[hereinafter
“Oman
Report”],
available
at
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/copyright-liability-of-states-1988.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YF3572N].
101. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (“Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee
of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune,
under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine
of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or
nongovernmental entity, for a violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner . . . .”).
102. Id. § 501(a).
103. 17 U.S.C. § 511(a). The disclaimer of immunity under “any” doctrine tacitly recognizes
the Court’s recent divorcing of the doctrine from its textual roots. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring), overruled by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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patent infringement suits two years later.104 Utilizing nearly identical
language, the two acts plainly foreclose the use of sovereign immunity as a
defense in infringement cases and make states liable in the same manner as
citizens.105
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,106 the Supreme Court struck down the PRCA, the sister statute
to the CRCA, as an overreach of congressional authority.107 The Court
agreed that the language of the PRCA clearly invoked abrogation, but after
Seminole Tribe, Congress’s abrogatory authority could only reside within the
Fourteenth Amendment.108 While courts have generally recognized
intellectual property as a form of property protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment,109 the Florida Prepaid Court maintained that merely negligent
state conduct cannot “‘deprive’ [a] person of property within the meaning of
the Due Process Clause.”110 Despite the fact that intent is not an element of
copyright infringement, the Court chided Congress for not distinguishing its
evidence of state infringement on the basis of intent.111 State infringement,
per this novel construction, is unconstitutional only if it is intentional or if the
state subsequently fails to offer an adequate remedy.112 Because state
infringement is not inherently unconstitutional, abrogation statutes must be
narrowly tailored to remedy the subset of infringements that are.113
After reviewing the testimony regarding state infringement contained in
the United States Senate and House reports, the Court concluded that the
evidence “suggested that most state infringement was innocent or at worst

104. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a).
105. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 511(a).
106. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
107. Id. at 647 (holding that the PRCA was not appropriately tailored to correcting
unconstitutional state patent infringement).
108. Id. at 648 (“Article I . . . does not give Congress the power to enact such legislation after
Seminole Tribe.”).
109. See Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 197 (1857) (“For, by the laws of the United States,
the rights of a party under a patent are his private property . . . .”); see also Consolidated Fruit-Jar
Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) (“A patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for
land.”). But see Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1008 (2020) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (“I believe the question whether copyrights are property within the
original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause remains open.”).
110. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
111. Id. at 643 (“Congress, however, barely considered the availability of state remedies for
patent infringement and hence whether the States’ conduct might have amounted to a constitutional
violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 639 (“[Congress] must identify conduct transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment’s
substantive provisions, and must tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct.”).

2021]

ALLEN V. COOPER

1233

negligent.”114 In the Court’s view, the limited record of actual due process
violations did not justify the sweeping remedy prescribed by the PRCA. 115
The Court listed several limitations Congress might have considered in order
to tailor the Act to more precisely address due process violations, such as
“limiting the remedy to certain types of infringement” (i.e., intentional or
knowing infringement) or “only against [s]tates with questionable remedies
or a high incidence of infringement.”116 With the Florida Prepaid precedent
looming large, the Court next turned from patent to copyright infringement
in Allen.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court addressed whether the CRCA
was a valid exercise of congressional power.117 The Court unanimously held
that Congress lacked the authority to enact the CRCA under either its Article
I or Fourteenth Amendment powers.118 After reviewing the enigmatic history
of the state sovereign immunity doctrine, the Court reiterated its two
requirements for permitting a federal court to hear a suit against a
nonconsenting state: (1) a clearly defined abrogation statute with (2) a valid
constitutional basis.119 The Court agreed that the CRCA contained
unequivocal language, but ruled that Congress lacked the authority to enact
it.120
Under a strict reading of Seminole Tribe, Article I can no longer provide
a basis for abrogation.121 The Court rejected Allen’s argument that the Katz
exception invited “a clause-by-clause approach” to analyzing the validity of
an abrogation statute supported by Article I.122 The Court justified this
exception by distinguishing bankruptcy suits in several ways.123
114. Id. at 645.
115. Id. at 645–47. But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997) (finding that
deficiencies in the legislative record should not sway judicial decision-making).
116. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 647.
117. 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1000–01.
120. Id. at 1001 (“No one here disputes that Congress used clear enough language to abrogate
the States’ immunity from copyright infringement suits.”).
121. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (“Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
122. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1002-03. See id. at 1003 (“Our decision, in short, viewed bankruptcy
as on a different plane, governed by principles all its own.”).
123. Id. First, the Court reasoned that bankruptcy proceedings do not offend state sovereignty
to the same extent as copyright infringement proceedings due to their in rem nature. Id. at 1002. In
rem proceedings are prosecuted against real property and assets, not people. Id. Second, the Court
looked to the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Clause, arguing that the Framers intended the
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Having foreclosed Article I, the Court next turned to Allen’s Fourteenth
Amendment argument.124 Finding the case analogous to Florida Prepaid, the
Court explained that the CRCA could not be upheld without overturning that
case because the PRCA and CRCA are functionally identical.125 Expressing
a robust appreciation of stare decisis, the Court maintained that precedent
should not be overturned without a “special justification” amounting to more
than the belief “that the precedent was wrongly decided.”126
The Court agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, but only if the abrogation statute passes
the “congruence and proportionality” test established in Boerne.127 Doubling
down on Florida Prepaid, the Court maintained that copyright infringement,
like patent infringement, violates the Due Process Clause only when it is
intentional or when the state fails to offer an adequate remedy. 128 The bulk
of the Court’s analysis analogized the legislative records of the PRCA and
CRCA and the evidence of state abuse contained therein.129 The Court was
unpersuaded of the existence of a widespread infringement problem.130 In
light of the expansive scope of the CRCA, which made states liable in all
cases of infringement, the Court concluded that the documented evidence of
actual due process violations and the sweeping remedy were
disproportionate.131 Offering an olive branch to Allen and other aggrieved
copyright holders, the Court speculated that Congress could enact an
acceptable intellectual property abrogation statute in the future, as long as it
is responsive to the Boerne test.132
federal government to play a “leading role” in establishing nationally uniform policies for
discharging debt. Id. Third, and perhaps most strikingly, the Court found that the language and
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Clause were together sufficient to abrogate state sovereign
immunity without any action from Congress. Id. at 1003 (“Relying on the above account of the
Framers’ intentions, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Clause itself did the abrogating.”)
(emphasis in original).
124. Id.
125. Id. (“[T]here is no difference between copyrights and patents under the Clause, nor any
material difference between the two statutes’ provisions.”).
126. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014) (citing Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
127. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1004 (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
128. Id. (“Under our precedent, a merely negligent act does not ‘deprive’ a person of property.”);
see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (conduct must be intentional or reckless to
violate the Due Process Clause).
129. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1007 (“Florida Prepaid all but prewrote our decision today.”).
130. Id. at 1006 (“[N]othing in the Oman Report, or the rest of the legislative record, cures the
problems we identified in Florida Prepaid.”).
131. Id. at 1007 (“Under Florida Prepaid, the CRCA thus must fail our ‘congruence and
proportionality’ test.”) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997)).
132. Id. (“That conclusion, however, need not prevent Congress from passing a valid copyright
abrogation law in the future.”). It is important to note that Seminole Tribe and Boerne were both
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Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, wrote a concurring opinion,
arguing that both Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment could support the
abrogation.133 Although both Justices Breyer and Ginsburg had dissented in
Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid and indicated their discomfort with the
majority’s current interpretation of the doctrine, they concurred because they
considered those cases to be binding precedent.134
Justice Thomas also wrote a concurring opinion addressing three
concerns.135 First, he spurned the Court’s approach to stare decisis as
needing a special justification beyond mere error to overrule a decision.136
Second, he voiced his opposition to advising Congress on crafting
hypothetical pieces of legislation.137 Third, he questioned whether copyrights
are encompassed within the original meaning of “property” under the
Fourteenth Amendment.138
IV. ANALYSIS
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court struck down the CRCA, holding
that Congress could not broadly abrogate state sovereign immunity from
copyright infringement lawsuits.139 As a result, states can now infringe with
impunity, subverting the goals of copyright law and leaving copyright
holders with no feasible remedy.140 This Note argues that, while consistent
with Boerne and Florida Prepaid, the case was wrongly decided because it
extends a series of errant decisions that collectively have blown the Court off
course from a constitutionally justifiable interpretation of the state sovereign
immunity doctrine.141
Section IV.A contends that the perennial ambiguity of the state
sovereign immunity doctrine and its atextual modern interpretation
undermine its application in the present case to categorically bar all copyright
infringement suits against states.142 Section IV.B argues that the CRCA
decided several years after the CRCA and PRCA were enacted. Thus, Congress believed that it
could pass those statutes in accordance with the just-decided opinion in Union Gas, and had no way
of knowing that the statutes and legislative record would be scrutinized under the Boerne test. Id.
133. Id. at 1008 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgement).
134. Id. at 1009 (“[R]ecognizing that my longstanding view has not carried the day, and that the
Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid controls this case, I concur in the judgment.”).
135. Id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
136. Id. at 1007–08.
137. Id. at 1008.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 999 (majority opinion).
140. See infra Section IV.D.
141. See infra Section IV.A.
142. See infra Section IV.A.
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should have been upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s Article I authority
to regulate intellectual property.143 Section IV.C raises a parallel argument
regarding the Fourteenth Amendment.144 Finally, Section IV.D suggests that
the practical effect of Allen is to encourage state infringement and unfair
market dominance—results which are openly at odds with the central tenets
of the copyright system.145
A. The Contentious History and Modern Atextual Interpretation of the
State Sovereign Immunity Doctrine Undermine its Application to
Bar Remedies for State Copyright Infringement
The contorted logic underlying the contemporary interpretation of state
sovereign immunity calls into question the precedential value of several
recent cases.146 The doctrine is mentioned nowhere in the Constitution and
has never been explicitly defined.147 It is more closely aligned with a
monarchial political philosophy than a democratic one, and thus does not
translate smoothly from English into American common law.148
Over time, a narrow majority of the Court has adopted an increasingly
broad interpretation of state sovereign immunity, resulting in an erosion of
available remedies for state intrusions on federally guaranteed rights.149 As
the doctrine now stands—at its most powerful point in history—these
remedies are now exclusively limited to situations where Congress, acting
pursuant to its authority to “appropriate[ly]” enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, enacts legislation with unequivocal language that is narrowly
tailored to remedying due process violations.150

143. See infra Section IV.B.
144. See infra Section IV.C.
145. See infra Section IV.D.
146. Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1988) (“[I]nstitutional values of stare decisis are ill-served by formal
adherence to a doctrine riddled with exceptions designed to counterbalance its evils.”).
147. Id. at 4 (“The Eleventh Amendment, and the doctrine . . . which it represents, has long been
perceived as a doctrinal abyss, replete with inconsistencies borne of pragmatic adjustments to the
principle for which it supposedly stands.”).
148. In contrast with the English feudal system, political authority in a representative democracy
like the United States derives principally from the people. See Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d
525, 537 (E.D.N.C. 2017) (“The founders envisioned and wrote a Constitution founded upon the
sovereignty of the people, not the states.”), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020). The doctrine’s invocation
of the invincible state appears to be at odds with the idea of democratic sovereignty, where authority
supposedly flows from, not to, the people. Id.
149. Jackson, supra note 146, at 3 (“[Sovereign] immunity is in tension with [the principle] . . .
that the law will generally provide a remedy for rights violated by the government . . . .”)
150. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997).
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The expansion of the doctrine to bar federal question suits and suits
brought by in-state plaintiffs ignores the explicit language in the Eleventh
Amendment, which only prohibits suits brought by out-of-state citizens.151
This stands as an exception to a traditionally accepted canon of statutory
construction.152 The text of the Amendment does not mention in-state
plaintiffs at all.153 If the Amendment aimed to treat in-state and out-of-state
plaintiffs equally, then there would have been no need to distinguish them.
While the enacted Amendment only literally bars diversity suits, earlier drafts
of the Amendment would have unconditionally barred suits against states in
all cases.154 This implies that the Amendment was only intended to bar
diversity suits.155 Furthermore, Chisholm—the impetus for the Amendment’s
passage—was a model diversity case.156 Recognizing the Amendment’s
specific exclusion of diversity suits, the Court in an early case affirmed that
the Eleventh Amendment did not bar federal question suits. 157 By straying
from this interpretation, the Court has steered the state sovereign immunity
doctrine away from its constitutional harbor into choppy and uncharted
waters.158

151. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
152. The interpretative canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the explicit mention of one
[thing] is the exclusion of another”) suggests that that when a specific class of people is specified,
an intention to exclude all others may be inferred. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
153. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
154. Michael Landau, State Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property Revisited, 22
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 513, 528 (2012) (“Congress rejected the first proposed
version of the Eleventh Amendment, which provided in part that ‘no state shall be liable to be made
a party defendant’ . . . which would have effectively barred both in-state and out-of-state citizen
suits.”) (citation omitted).
155. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign
Policy Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 283, 292 (2003) (“The case for expresio
unius is also stronger when the subject matter of the proposed implicit exception was within the
contemplation of the drafters.”).
156. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 466 (1793) (“The grand and principal question in this
case is, whether a State can . . . be sued by an individual citizen of another State?”). Thus, if the
passage of the Eleventh Amendment can be accurately characterized as a reaction to Chisholm, the
legislature was reacting to a diversity case. Id.
157. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 382 (1821).
158. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999) (expanding scope of sovereign immunity
to prohibit suits against states in state court). The departure of sovereign immunity jurisprudence
from reliance on the text is best described as a rejection of the idea that the doctrine is limited in
any way by the text of the Eleventh Amendment. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 779 (1991).
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B. The Court Should Have Deferred to Congress’s Article I Authority
to Regulate and Protect Copyrights
The Court supported the idea that Congress may abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I authority until its 5–4 ruling in
Seminole Tribe unexpectedly foreclosed that route.159 Given the Court’s
subsequent retreat in Katz from that holding, and the fact that copyright
infringement is exclusively in the federal domain, the Court erred in relying
on Seminole Tribe as controlling authority and instead should have looked to
the text of the Intellectual Property Clause.160
1. The Overbroad Holding in Seminole Tribe Capriciously
Forecloses Congress’s Authority to Abrogate State Sovereign
Immunity Pursuant to Article I
The Court in Seminole Tribe went astray when it boldly rejected all of
Article I as a potential basis for abrogation.161 In overturning Union Gas, a
majority of the Court abandoned the idea that the states had implicitly waived
sovereign immunity by ratifying Article I.162 Strikingly, the holding
extended to all of Article I, despite the fact that Article I encompasses a broad
range of powers, including in areas like intellectual property, which are the
exclusive province of the federal government.163 The practical result of
Seminole Tribe is to preclude any possibility of grounding intellectual
property abrogation statutes on the Intellectual Property Clause—as

159. See Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 475 (1987) (“We
assume . . . that the authority of Congress to subject unconsenting States to suit in federal court is
not confined to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Although Congress’s Article I powers are
extensive, the Court did not categorically permit Article I powers to be used to abrogate sovereign
immunity in all cases. See Emps. of the Dep’t of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Dep’t of Pub. Health &
Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286–87 (1973) (“[W]e decline to extend Parden to cover every exercise by
Congress of its commerce power . . . .”).
160. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 652
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It was equally appropriate for Congress to abrogate state sovereign
immunity in patent infringement cases in order to close a potential loophole in the uniform federal
scheme, which, if undermined, would necessarily decrease the efficacy of the process afforded to
patent holders.”).
161. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (“Article I cannot be used to
circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.”).
162. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (“Congress’[s] authority to regulate
commerce includes the authority directly to abrogate States’ immunity from suit.”), overruled by
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44. Furthermore, every federal circuit court to have faced this issue has
decided in favor of abrogation. Id. at 15.
163. Id.
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Congress intended with the CRCA and PRCA—enabling the Allen Court to
completely ignore the text and legislative history of the clause.164
The holding of Seminole Tribe was undermined by the Court’s later
allowance of an exception for bankruptcy suits in Katz.165 The Katz Court
sidestepped a proper stare decisis analysis by simply claiming that the
relevant language of Seminole Tribe, which stated, “Article I cannot be used
to circumvent the constitutional limitation placed upon federal jurisdiction,”
was dicta rather than a holding.166 But if the Bankruptcy Clause could be
entertained and upheld as an exception automatically justifying abrogation,
then why did the Allen Court not even consider the Intellectual Property
Clause?
2. The Intellectual Property Clause Deserves Recognition as
Establishing a Fundamental Federal Power
Unique among Article I powers, the Intellectual Property Clause
empowers Congress to “secure[] … exclusive Right[s]” to copyright
holders.167 This language implies that the Framers intended the copyright
holder to be the sole lawful owner of the work.168 Like bankruptcy,
intellectual property laws are federally uniform, with federal courts enjoying
exclusive jurisdiction over patent and copyright suits.169 This uniformity is
key for the system to function most effectively.170 Historically, the Court has

164. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 636 (“Seminole
Tribe makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article
I powers; hence the Patent Remedy Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or
the Patent Clause.”).
165. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006).
166. Id. at 363 (“We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in [Seminole Tribe] reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to
the Bankruptcy Clause. . . . Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however, that that
assumption was erroneous.”).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
168. THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 267 (James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1908) (“The utility of this
power will scarcely be questioned. . . . The States cannot separately make effectual provision for
either [copyrights or patents], and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws
passed at the instance of Congress.”).
169. See Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 711 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (“The entire structure
of the patent laws is meant to provide a national, uniform system to provide the most meaningful
protection for the inventor.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (“The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety
protection, copyrights and trademarks. No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for
relief arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, or copyrights.”).
170. J. Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 502, p. 402 (R.
Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987) (“It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should
possess this power; to authors and inventors, because, otherwise, they would be subjected to the

1240

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1221

held that states have implicitly waived immunity in areas that are federally
preempted.171 That was precisely the basis for the Court’s decision in Katz,
which abrogated state sovereign immunity from bankruptcy suits because
Congress had clearly intended bankruptcy laws to be uniform.172 These facts,
along with the plain text of the Intellectual Property Clause, provide strong
evidence that states had implicitly waived sovereign immunity from
intellectual property suits by ratifying the Constitution, as they had
apparently done in bankruptcy suits.173
C. The Court Should Have Deferred to Congress’s Authority to
Enforce the Protections of the Fourteenth Amendment
In addition to the strong support from Article I, the CRCA should also
have been upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment
powers.174 The CRCA is designed to remedy state infringement in a fair and
uniform way that simultaneously respects the Framers’ intentions in
establishing the copyright system, adheres to the actual text of the
Constitution, and protects the rights of copyright holders.175
In applying the Boerne test to intellectual property, the Court placed too
much weight on the record of state infringement.176 Also, the Court erred in
introducing an intent element to determine whether an infringing state had
violated the Due Process Clause.177 This is inconsistent with copyright law,
under which infringement is a strict liability offense.178

varying laws and systems of the different states on this subject, which would impair, and might even
destroy the value of their rights.”).
171. Landau, supra note 154, at 560.
172. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 379 (2006).
173. Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 711 (“[I]n granting to Congress the right to create exclusive
patents, the states largely surrendered their sovereignty over patents.”).
174. See Allen v. Cooper, 244 F. Supp. 3d 525, 540 (E.D.N.C. 2017) (“Congress has clearly
abrogated state immunity in cases arising under the CRCA, and such an abrogation is congruent and
proportional to a clear pattern of abuse by the states.”), rev’d, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (“[I]nfringement must be intentional, or at
least reckless, to come within the reach of the Due Process Clause.”).
178. See 17 U.S.C. § 501. Consider two similarly situated defendants in two copyright
infringement suits: a state agency and a citizen. Despite being sued under the very same law, courts
would have to assess intent with regard to the agency—but not the citizen—in order to conduct a
proper analysis.
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1. The Court Overstated the Significance of the CRCA’s Record of
State Infringement
The Court’s requirement of a substantial record of past infringement as
reflected in the CRCA’s legislative history presents several problems. First,
it stands at odds with the Court’s assurance that Congress may pass
“prophylactic legislation.”179 Second, the most relevant timeframe for
Congress to assess state infringement was the few years between the Court’s
tightening of the “unequivocal language” requirement in 1985 and the
passage of the CRCA, and it was unreasonable to expect Congress to find a
record brimming with infringement in this short time. 180 By limiting its
assessment of state infringement to the 1988 Oman Report, the Court
conveniently ignored every instance of infringement that has occurred
since.181 There are several other reasons why the actual number of instances
of infringement is likely much higher than documented in the legislative
record.182 States were historically unprotected from infringement suits and
thus naturally deterred from infringing, so the relative scarcity of litigation is
hardly surprising.183 But in the wake of the Court’s decisions restricting
Congress’s abrogatory authority, the fear (now fact) that states can simply
assert immunity and win the case discourages aggrieved copyright holders
from filing suit in the first place.184 After Allen, district courts must follow
the decision of the Supreme Court and can no longer make an independent
finding.185 This means that copyright holders simply cannot prevail against
a state until Congress passes a new abrogation statute that is acceptable to the
Court.186 Finally, the Copyright Office does not have the resources or
179. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 88 (2000). Ironically, the very same opinion
in which the Court introduces a test that dramatically restricts permissible abrogations also claims
to grant “much deference” to Congress in designing Fourteenth Amendment legislation. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (“It is for Congress in the first instance to ‘determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and
its conclusions are entitled to much deference.”) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted).
180. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985).
181. Brief for Ralph Oman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14, Allen v. Cooper, 140
S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877), https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18877/87373/20190207102951115_2019-02-07%20No%2018877%20Oman%20Amicus%20Br.pdf [hereinafter Brief for Ralph Oman].
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Marybeth Statement, supra note 97, at 14–15. Even if sovereign immunity concerns do not
preempt filing altogether, most disputes end with a settlement agreement rather than proceeding to
trial. Landau, supra note 154, at 553.
185. See generally Alan M. Trammell, Precedent and Preclusion, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 565
(2017) (explaining the history and contours of the rule that lower courts must follow binding
precedent).
186. Id.
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authority to assemble a comprehensive catalogue of state infringement.187
The Oman Report solicited information by means of a news bulletin, and the
study was by no means intended to be exhaustive, or even comprehensive.188
Even if states do not begin systematically abusing copyrights, each
infringement deserves a remedy.189 There should not be a magic number of
violations of any type of conduct required to warrant a remedy.190 Under this
purely reactionary framework, there would be no reason to outlaw murder,
for example, if the murder rate was low. Also, the problems are only going
to get worse as intellectual property becomes increasingly important to state
enterprises and business.191 Courts should not only look to the history of state
conduct, but also consider the foreseeable future.192
2. State Copyright Infringement is a “De Facto” Infringement of a
Copyright Holder’s Due Process Rights
The Court’s complaint that the CRCA’s record did not distinguish
intentional and unintentional state violations is unwarranted because intent is
not an essential element of a copyright infringement claim.193 Intent can,
however, substantially affect the award of statutory damages.194 A state that
only negligently infringes could be held liable for a lesser amount, and the
same would be true if the parties’ positions were reversed.195 Thus, even with
a broad abrogation, as intended by the CRCA, the law is flexible enough to

187. Brief for Ralph Oman, supra note 181, at 13.
188. Id. at 8–9.
189. Justice John Marshall famously decreed that for every violation of a legal right, there should
be a corresponding remedy. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
190. Id.
191. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: 2016 Update, 1
(2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-motion/intellectual-property-and-useconomy [https://perma.cc/GLB9-EPD5] (“IP-intensive industries continue to be a major, integral
and growing part of the U.S. economy.”); see also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 657 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“States and their
instrumentalities are heavily involved in the federal patent system.”).
192. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 654–55.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner” will be held liable as an infringer). Copyright infringement cases generally proceed
predictably. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (providing an
overview of copyright infringement doctrine). First, the court asks the plaintiff to demonstrate
ownership of a valid copyright. Id. Second, the court looks for evidence that the defendant copied
any original and protectable elements of that work. Id.
194. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (stating that in cases where the infringement is unintentional, the
minimum statutory damages award may be lowered from $750 to $200 but in cases where the
infringement is willful, the maximum statutory damages award may be increased from $30,000 to
$150,000).
195. Id.
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account for intent and allocate damages accordingly.196 This flexibility
enables the CRCA to treat states fairly and simultaneously hold them
accountable for their actions.197
Florida Prepaid held that a copyright owner’s due process rights are
violated when an infringing state fails to offer an adequate remedy.198 But a
damages award from a successful infringement suit is, in most cases, the only
remedy that can adequately compensate the copyright owner.199 The state
law causes of action that the Court suggested as alternatives are insufficient
because they do not allow for the same degree of damages awards. 200 A
plaintiff asserting a copyright infringement claim may seek (1) an injunction
to prevent further copying; (2) actual damages based on a calculation of lost
profits; or (3) statutory damages if actual damages cannot easily be
determined.201 Seeking an injunction is often not a viable strategy because
by the time it is issued, the damage has already been done.202 An award of
statutory damages, however, can net up to $150,000 per instance of
infringement.203 Thus, striking down the CRCA and barring all infringement
suits against states deprives aggrieved copyright holders of any meaningful
recourse.
D. Failure to Hold States Liable for Copyright Infringement Subverts
the Fundamental Goals of the Copyright System to Promote and
Protect Artistic Expression
The copyright system enables artists to enrich the world with the fruits
of their creative labors.204 The value of a copyright is derived from the
exclusive rights vested in the owner; securing these rights is essential to a fair
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 642–
44 (1999).
199. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the lack of comparable remedies
underscores the importance of the CRCA and PRCA).
200. Id. at 659. Also, suits against states generally cannot be brought in state court either. See
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 759–60 (1999).
201. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433–34 (1984); 17
U.S.C. § 504.
202. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994 (2020) (No. 18-877).
Once copyrighted material has been widely shared on the Internet, for example, the copyright owner
can never fully regain exclusive control. Id. Also, court costs and attorney’s fees cannot be
recovered by a plaintiff seeking an injunction, while they can be recouped by a plaintiff seeking
damages, making the latter a more appealing option. Id.
203. 17 U.S.C. § 504.
204. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United States
and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public
from the labors of authors.”).
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and properly functioning system.205 The system must delicately balance the
rights of artists to control and profit from their works with the benefits gained
by society.206 Allen squarely disrupts this balance by allowing states to
exploit copyrighted works without permission.207 On average, people are less
likely to create protectable works now that states can freely infringe.208
Now, more than ever, states are deeply engaged in copyright-intensive
enterprises such as education, publishing, research, and tourism.209
Leveraging sovereign immunity in the intellectual property marketplace
upsets the balance between states and private actors and disincentivizes
creators from working with states.210 There are several recent examples—
that the Court either failed to capture or willfully ignored—of states
successfully asserting sovereign immunity in order to claim ownership of
works that were codeveloped with private entities.211 When states are able to
extract “substantial concessions of basic rights under the Copyright Act” by
simply citing Allen, it is clear that they can easily obtain a financial advantage
and unfairly burden copyright owners.212 The Supreme Court has in the past
cautioned states that when they act like a business, they will be treated like

205. Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106.
206. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (specifying that “the “fair use” of a copyrighted work . . . for “purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”).
207. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 652
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id.
209. In the past forty years, over 32,000 copyright registrations have been assigned to state
universities. Marybeth Statement, supra note 97, at 18.
210. Oman Report, supra note 100, at 15–16.
211. See Mktg. Info. Masters, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. St. Univ. Sys., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1088
(S.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing copyright infringement suit regarding state university’s alleged
plagiarism of private report); InfoMath, Inc. v. Univ. of Ark., 633 F. Supp. 2d 674 (E.D. Ark. 2007)
(dismissing copyright infringement suit regarding state university’s unauthorized use of privatelyowned course content); Jacobs v. Memphis Convention & Visitors Bureau, 710 F. Supp. 2d 663
(W.D. Tenn. 2010) (dismissing copyright infringement suit regarding state tourist agency’s
unauthorized use of copyrighted images); Xechem Int’l, Inc. v. Univ. of Tex. M.D. Anderson
Cancer Ctr., 382 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (dismissing patent infringement suit regarding
codeveloped cancer drug).
212. Oman Report, supra note 100, at 11 (“Schools expect permission to create literally
thousands of copies of translations or thousands of audio cassettes or derivative works and they
expect publishers to grant these permissions at no charge.”); see also Marybeth Statement, supra
note 97, at 14–15.
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one.213 But the expansion of sovereign immunity to allow states to infringe
with impunity flouts this principle.214
One potential solution to the problem Allen creates is for Congress to
“play hardball” with the states by conditioning federal funding on a state’s
waiver of sovereign immunity from intellectual property suits. 215 Congress
already has a history of successfully employing similar tactics to further other
policy objectives, such as raising the drinking age.216 A conditional waiver
of immunity may be a practical solution if addressing state infringement is
found to be reasonably related to a specific area of federal funding.217
Congress’s clearest path forward, however, as suggested by the Court,
is to try again to craft an abrogation statute that satisfies the Boerne test by
relying on an updated catalogue of infringement.218 This new statute could
distinguish intentional and unintentional state conduct in order to paint a
clearer picture of the ongoing problems.219 The urgency of the situation has
prompted a rapid response: a study is already underway between Congress
and the Patent and Copyright Offices to define the contours of this
prospective law.220 The first phase of the study involved a comment
solicitation period from the Copyright Office directed towards aggrieved
copyright holders and other interested stakeholders.221 The goal of the public
comment period, as evidenced by the questionnaire, was to create a catalogue

213. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964) (“[W]hen a
state . . . enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation
as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.”).
214. Noticeably, the federal government has agreed to play by the rules, promising money
damages in federal court when it violates the exclusive rights of a citizen copyright owner. 28
U.S.C. § 1498(b) (“[W]henever the copyright in any work protected under the copyright laws of the
United States shall be infringed by the United States . . . the exclusive action which may be brought
for such infringement shall be an action by the copyright owner against the United States in the
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation as damages for
such infringement . . . .”).
215. Landau, supra note 154, at 561.
216. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1983) (holding that Congress may condition
a state’s receipt of federal highway funds on the state agreeing to raise the drinking age to twentyone). The condition was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress’s spending power because it was
“reasonably calculated” to address the public welfare concern of drunk driving. Id. at 209.
217. Landau, supra note 154, at 562 (arguing that such a condition would “certain[ly]” be
upheld).
218. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1007 (2020) (“[The decision] need not prevent Congress
from passing a valid abrogation law in the future.”).
219. Id.
220. Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,252
(June 3, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/03/2020-12019/sovereignimmunity-study-notice-and-request-for-public-comment.
221. Id.
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of state infringement that satisfies the constraints of the Boerne test.222 The
comment period was extended twice, from two months to four.223 On
November 5, 2020, the Patent and Trademark Office launched its own
parallel request for information to measure recent trends in state patent and
trademark infringement.224
On December 11, 2020, the Copyright Office held a roundtable
discussion over Zoom, inviting stakeholders from all over the country to
voice their concerns in the wake of Allen.225 The discussions centered around
three major topics: (1) evidence of state infringement; (2) state policies or
practices regarding infringement; and (3) whether alternative remedies could
be considered adequate.226 The anecdotal testimony and survey results
presented therein will surely provide useful guidance as Congress considers
the next steps.
V. CONCLUSION
In Allen v. Cooper, the Supreme Court held that the CRCA was an
unconstitutional attempt by Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity
from copyright infringement suits, as it was not sufficiently tailored to
remedy violations of a constitutional magnitude and failed to show a
conclusive pattern of state misconduct.227 This holding, which effectively
bars all remedies when a state infringes, does not comport with either the
222. Id. (“Please provide information regarding . . . [w]hether the infringement was intentional
or reckless, and the basis for that conclusion[.]”).
223. Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 37,961
(June 24, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/24/2020-13725/sovereignimmunity-study-notice-and-request-for-public-comment; Sovereign Immunity Study: Notice and
Request for Public Comment (extending deadline to September 2 for “initial comments” and
October 2 for “written reply comments and empirical research studies”); Sovereign Immunity
Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 85 Fed. Reg. 61,034 (Sep. 29, 2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/29/2020-21566/sovereign-immunity-studynotice-and-request-for-public-comment (extending deadline to October 22).
224. Sovereign Immunity Study, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,589 (Nov. 5, 2020),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/05/2020-24621/sovereign-immunity-study.
This request was subsequently expanded to provide for additional questions. Sovereign Immunity
Study,
86
Fed.
Reg.
6636
(Jan.
22,
2021),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/22/2021-01305/sovereign-immunity-study.
225. Sovereign Immunity Study: Announcement of Public Roundtables, 85 Fed. Reg. 70,654
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/11/05/2020-24577/sovereignimmunity-study-announcement-of-public-roundtables.
226. U.S. Copyright Office, State Sovereign Immunity Study, COPYRIGHT.GOV (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity. For the full text of the proceedings,
see Transcript of Proceedings, In re Sovereign Immunity Roundtables, U.S. Copyright Office (Dec.
11, 2020), https://www.copyright.gov/policy/state-sovereign-immunity/2020.12.11-roundtabletranscript.pdf.
227. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 999 (2020).
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plain text of the Constitution or the public policy goals of the copyright
system.228 Although both Article I and the Fourteenth Amendment grant
Congress wide latitude to protect intellectual property,229 artists and inventors
are now more vulnerable than ever to state exploitation in the wake of this
short-sighted decision.230 The silver lining is that abrogating sovereign
immunity from copyright suits need not require the reversal of any Supreme
Court precedent as long as Congress moves forward with creating an
enhanced catalogue of state infringement, which it appears to be doing.231
These recent developments inspire hope that the copyright protections
intended by the Framers will soon be restored, enabling smooth sailing once
again in the copyright seas.

228.
229.
230.
231.

See supra Section IV.A
See supra Sections IV.B–C.
See supra Section IV.D.
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